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Has Crockford
relinquished

its

show

failed to

jurisdiction, or

when

it

that the district court

abused

its

discretion

When

it

denied Crockford’s motion under Idaho Criminal Rule

35(b)?

ARGUMENT
Crockford Has Failed T0
A.

Show That The

District Court

Abused

Sentencing Discretion

Its

Introduction

home 0f his

In July 0f 2019, Crockford and his then-girlfriend drove to the

A.G. (Conf. Docs., pp. 33, 2009.)
himself if she did not come out.

He

(Id.)

called A.G. and told her that he

When

she

came

out,

eX-girlfriend,

had a gun and would

kill

Crockford was holding a gun pointed

at his

stomach and again threatened

to kill

himself if she did not get in the

car.

Crockford, his then-girlfriend attempted t0 force A.G. into the

car.

(Id.)

the vehicle himself and attempted to force A.G. into the car.

(Id.)

When

A.G. screaming for help and come out of the house, Crockford

mom, Iwant to

shoot your

mom.”

(Id.)

said,

(Id.)

Instructed

by

Crockford then exited
A.G.’s mother heard

“I’m going to shoot your

Crockford and his then—girlfriend ﬂed.

(Id.)

That night,

Crockford continued t0 harass A.G. through text messages and by accessing her social media
account, posting messages purportedly from her.

(Conf. Docs., pp. 33-34, 2009.)

contacted Crockford the following day and informed

ﬁrearm tucked

in his waistband, tried t0 hide the gun,

stand-off. (Conf. Docs., pp. 34-35,

an extremely

realistic

2009)

When police

him he was under

arrest,

When

he ﬂed with a

and then was apprehended

after a short

found the gun, they discovered that

appearing Airsoft pistol. (Conf. Docs., pp. 10-1

1,

police

it

was

25-26, 2009-2010.)

Crockford was charged With attempted second degree kidnapping and aggravated

assault,

both felonies, as well as stalking in the second degree and resisting and/or obstructing ofﬁcers,
both misdemeanors.

(R., pp. 37-39.)

evaluation pursuant to Idaho

Code

The

§ 18-21

district court

1.

granted a motion for a competency

(R., pp. 25-31.)

The evaluation determined

that,

while Crockford does appear to have an “Antisocial Personality Disorder and a history of mild
intellectual disability,”

he was competent t0 proceed. (Conf. Docs.,

p. 18.)

Crockford accepted a

plea agreement pursuant t0 Which he pled guilty to aggravated assault and second degree

stalking—with the
jurisdiction

charges.

state to

recommend no more than ﬁve

years with two years

0n the former and time served 0n the latter—While the

(R., p. 40;

Supp. TL,

p. 5, Ls. 9-18.)

state

ﬁxed and

retained

dismissed the other

Prior to sentencing, the district court ordered a

psychological evaluation, domestic Violence evaluation, as well as a presentence report. (R., pp.
53—60.)

At

sentencing, after statements from A.G. and her mother, the state followed the plea

agreement and recommended that the court sentence Crockford to ﬁve years with two years ﬁxed

and retain jurisdiction. (Supp.

Tr., p. 9, L. 5

—

p. 11, L. 23.)

Defense counsel asked the court

“consider placing [Crockford] on probation in this case.” (Supp. Tr., p. 12, L. 3
district court

— p.

The

14, L. 4.)

imposed a sentence 0f ﬁve years With three years ﬁxed on the aggravated

to

assault

charge, and 180 days 0n the second degree stalking charge, the sentences to run concurrently, and

retained jurisdiction. (TL, p. 16, L. 9

An APSI recommended
refusal to complete

The

— p.

20, L. 18; R., pp. 65-68.)

that the court relinquish

programming and repeated

district court relinquished its jurisdiction.

Three months

later,

its

jurisdiction based

disciplinary issues.

(TL, p.

9, L.

22 — p.

0n Crockford’s

(Conf. Docs., pp. 2680-90.)

10, L. 15; R., pp. 72-74.)

Crockford ﬁled a motion for a reduction 0f sentence under Idaho

Criminal Rule 35(b), attaching a

letter

from his adoptive mother discussing his alleged mental

health issues and a letter he authored in which he discussed his behavioral improvement, the extent

t0

Which he had beneﬁted from programming, and

district court

his fear

0f COVID-19. (Aug, pp. 8-12.) The

denied the motion. (Aug, pp. 1-3.)

Crockford timely appealed from the

district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction

and

the denial of his motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b). (R., pp. 75-77.)

B.

Standard

Of Review

This Court reviews appellate challenges to the length of a sentence, the determination to
relinquish jurisdiction, and the denial of a motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) for abuse 0f

discretion. State V.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016) (length of sentence);

m
m

V.

Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166, 296 P.3d 371, 372 (2013) (relinquishment ofjurisdiction);

V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007) (denial ofmotion under Idaho Criminal

Rule 35(b)). In evaluating whether a lower court abused
a four-part inquiry, Which asks “Whether the

its

discretion, the appellate court conducts

trial court: (1)

discretion; (2) acted Within the outer boundaries

correctly perceived the issue as one of

0f its discretion;

legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available t0

exercise of reason.”

Lunneborg

V.

State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270,

MV Fun Life,

It is

presumed

that the

0f conﬁnement. State
is

and

(4)

reached

Is

sentence

is

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

V. Oliver,

it

will be the defendant’s probable term

The

When

at 8,

district court

368 P.3d

is

all

628

(citations omitted).

To

a clear abuse of

carry this burden

excessive under any reasonable View of the facts. Li.

0f the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or

A

retribution.

has the discretion t0 weigh those obj ectives and give them differing weights

deciding upon the sentence. Li. at

965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding
objectives

at

it is

appears necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective of protecting

society and t0 achieve any or

Li.

(citing

144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence

must show the sentence

reasonable if

by the

Not Excessive

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

the appellant

decision

its

429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018)

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that

discretion.

With the

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

Crockford’s Sentence

C.

it;

(3) acted consistently

9,

368 P.3d

district court

at

629; State V. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825,

did not abuse

its

discretion in concluding that the

0f punishment, deterrence and protection 0f society outweighed the need for

rehabilitation).

“In deference to the

trial

judge, this Court Will not substitute

reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

628 (quoting

m,

146 Idaho

at

its

8,

View of a
368 P.3d

148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence

at

ﬁxed

within the limits prescribed by the statute Will ordinarily not be considered an abuse 0f discretion

by the

trial

court.”

Li

(quoting State V. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).

Crockford’s underlying sentence of ﬁve years with three years ﬁxed
limits.

E

I.C. § 18-906.

T0 show

that

it is

reasonable View 0f the facts under Which

He

goals of sentencing.

The

within statutory

show

that there is

n0

might be Viewed as necessary t0 accomplish any 0f the

it

so.

court recognized

district

sentencing.

cannot do

excessive, he therefore has to

is

(Supp. Tr., p. 16, L. 9

its

discretion

p.

17, L. 2.)

—

and

explicitly considered the

goals of

The court expressed concern regarding
“most of

[it

involved] Victimizing somebody.” (Supp. Tr., p. 17, Ls. 3-5; p. 18, Ls. 20-23.) That concern

is

Crockford’s extensive criminal history—albeit

much 0f it juvenile—and

the fact that

supported by the record, Which shows a long string 0f Violent crimes, including a large number of
assault, disturbing the peace, batter,

and disorderly conduct charges, as well as a charge of lewd

conduct With a minor, and repeated probation Violations. (Conf. Docs, pp. 201

1- 14 (not

including

the present crimes, reﬂecting seven misdemeanors, one felony, and one probation Violation as a

juvenile, as well as four

are Violent).)

misdemeanors and one probation Violation as an

He acknowledged

Docs., pp. 2644.)

The court recognized

(Conf.

that the current crimes follow Crockford’s pattern

As

of

the court noted, Crockford attempted

kidnap A.G., threatening both her and her mother With What they had every reason t0 believe

was a gun. (Supp. TL,
p. 18, Ls. 4-8.)

When

p. 17, Ls. 15-21.)

He

then harassed her through social media. (Supp.

confronted by police, Crockford ﬂed from them while

they had every reason t0 believe was a gun, putting himself and others
L.

many of which

a prior incident 0f domestic Violence involving a gun.

Victimization, often in a Violent and dangerous manner.

t0

adult,

22 —

p. 18, L. 3;

Conf. Docs., p. 35.)

appeared to show very
T11, p. 18, Ls. 15-19;

little

The

district court

p.

61 (telling police that he

holding what

(Supp. Tr., p. 17,

expressed concern that Crockford

remorse, in fact suggesting that he was

Conf. Docs.,

at risk.

still

Tr.,

somehow helping A.G.

was

trying to get A.G.

(Supp.

away from

her “controlling” mother).) The court noted that the psychological evaluation the court ordered

determined that Crockford was a high risk to re-offend (TL,
“physical aggression and manipulation.”

stalking.

(Conf. Docs., pp. 2638, 2651.)

was a high

11-14), including

17, Ls.

(Conf. Docs., pp. 1974-75.)

Violence evaluation determined that Crockford

and

p.

by

Likewise, the domestic

risk for both future domestic Violence

A discharge report issued in 2014

after

Crockford

received treatment associated with a conviction for sexual misconduct characterized Crockford as
a “Very High” risk 0f impulsive, sexual acting out, and a Moderate-High risk 0f sexual recidivism.

(Conf. Docs., p. 2558.)

The court concluded

particularly in light of the extent to

(Supp. Tr., p. 19, L. 17

— p.

20, L.

that the underlying sentence

was

appropriate,

which Crockford was dangerous and t0 protect the community.
1.)

Nevertheless, the court provided Crockford an opportunity

for “an evaluative Rider” t0 convince the court that he deserves “a chance

on probation.” (Supp.

Tr., p. 20, Ls. 2-7.)

The

district court

did not abuse

its

discretion.

It

was justiﬁably concerned about

the

aggravated nature of the crimes of Which Crockford had been convicted; his criminal history,
including

many crimes of Violence;

his failure to recognize the

serious nature of his crimes; and the suggestion

by

harm caused

t0 his Victims

the psychological evaluation that he

and the

was both

a risk t0 reoffend and not particularly amenable to treatment, as well as other expert evaluators

concurring that that he represented a high risk to reoffend. State V. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 95, 856

P.2d 872, 885 (1993) (“[T]he

trial

court

was concerned

in sentencing Araiza with the protection

0f society—the primary goal in sentencing. Although reasonable minds might differ Whether the
sentences imposed were necessary for the protection 0f society,
are excessive under

any reasonable View of the

permitted Crockford an opportunity t0

show

that

facts.”).

we

cannot say that the sentences

Even with

that concern, the court

he was a good candidate for probation.

Crockford argues that the

He

consider his mental health.

and indicated

that

it

is

district court

incorrect.

The

35,

it

As

discretion

district court

its

t0 treatment” in fashioning the sentence

pp. 1974-75.)

its

had reviewed the evaluation. (Supp. TL,

the court cited the psychological evaluation and

amenable

abused

the court later noted in ruling

by

failing to appropriately

ordered a psychological evaluation
p. 16, L.

22 —

p. 17, L. 2.)

In fact,

conclusion that Crockford was “not particularly

it

did. (Supp. Tr., p. 17, Ls. 11-14;

Conf. Docs.,

0n Crockford’s motion under Idaho Criminal Rule

“was well aware 0f [Crockford’s] medical and psychological history when

imposed

it

sentence.” (Aug., p. 2.) “[M]ental illness and substance abuse can be mitigating, or aggravating,
or both.” State V. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661,

_, 462 P.3d 1125, 1144 (2020); ﬂ also State

V. Strand,

137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002) (holding that there was no abuse of discretion where
the district court considered defendant’s mental health conditions, but placed greater weight

need to protect the community and punish the defendant); State
P.3d 935, 944 (201

1)

(same).

sentencing and Crockford

do—reweigh the
P.3d

at

is

The

district court

simply asking

V. Miller,

151 Idaho 828, 837, 264

was well aware 0f Crockford’s mental

this

Court t0 do What

factors the district court considered in sentencing.

it

on the

issues at

repeatedly declines t0

GLcia, 166 Idaho

at

_, 462

1144-45.

Crockford has not shown that the

district court

abused its sentencing discretion by imposing

an excessive sentence.

D.

Crockford Has Not

Shown That The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV Relinquishing

Jurisdiction

In deciding to relinquish jurisdiction or grant probation, the district court should consider

“all

0f the circumstances to assess the defendant’s

ability t0

succeed in a less structured

environment and t0 determine the course of action that Will further the purposes of rehabilitation,

protection of society, deterrence, and retribution.”

A court does not abuse

290, 292 (2001).

shows

Even where prison

make

it

and determined

367 P.3d 265, 269

State V. Pelland, 159 Idaho 870,

ofﬁcials

30 P.3d

discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction if the record

that the district court “properly considered the information before

probation was not appropriate.”
2016).

its

State V. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137,

(Ct.

that

App.

a recommendation for probation following a period 0f

retained jurisdiction, such a recommendation “does not alone create an abuse 0f discretion in the

district

judge’s decision not to place the defendant on probation.”

P.3d

292.

at

Here, the

APSI recommended

documented a variety of disciplinary

that the court relinquish

issues

programming. (Conf. Docs., pp. 2680-90.)

its

m,

136 Idaho

at 137,

jurisdiction over Crockford

and a complete lack of willingness

30

and

t0 participate in

When confronted With disciplinary issues,

Crockford

responded, “I don’t give a fuck,” “I don’t really fucking care,” and otherwise expressed disdain
for prison ofﬁcials

and the programming intended

succeed 0n probation.

“vague threats” t0

(Conf. Docs., p. 2682.)

He

to assist

him

regularly

made

staff and other inmates. (Conf. Docs., p. 2683.)

in establishing his ability to

“anti-social statements”

and

For example, in “an attempt

to

intimidate” one 0f his instructors, he told the instructor that he had previously “shanked” another

instructor.

(Conf. Docs., p. 2686.) Crockford then chose to sign himself out 0f the programming

well before completion. (Conf. Docs, p. 2683.)
A11 of this

was

despite the fact that, at sentencing,

when

the district court initially granted

a period of retained jurisdiction despite the court’s deep concerns about the danger presented

by

Crockford, the serious nature 0f his crimes, and his inability t0 control himself, the court was

completely clear that Crockford needed to complete his programming and perform exceptionally
well for the court t0 consider probation at the end of the period of retained jurisdiction.

(Supp.

Tr., p. 19, L.

9

jurisdiction, the

—

p. 20, L. 7.)

At

the jurisdiction review hearing,

when

the court relinquished

judge again expressed concern about the danger Crockford presented, the serious

nature 0f his crimes, and his criminal history, and noted that he had explained at sentencing that

he would grant a rider but that Crockford “really had t0 show

that

he was capable of making

good decisions and doing well 0n the Rider” or the court would relinquish jurisdiction.
L.

22 —

which

p. 10, L. 8.)

is

As

the court correctly found, Crockford

consistent with the Department’s

p. 10, L. 8.) In addition to the

history, the determination

to treatment,

reason for the

district court t0

that

recommendation 0f relinquishment.”

“by any

stretch,

(Tr., p. 9, L.

22 —

information regarding the nature of this crime, Crockford’s criminal

by professionals

and his repeated

had not done

(Tr., p. 9,

failures

that

he was a high risk for re-offense and not amenable

on probation,

conclude, in

its

his abj ect failure during his rider

discretion, that

was

excellent

Crockford was not a good candidate

for probation.

Crockford’s argument t0 the contrary

is

premised on the claim that he did not receive

mental health treatment While incarcerated, suggesting that explains his failure to succeed during
the rider. (Appellant’s brief, p. 5-6.)

when he

He

claims, for example, that “he

signed out of the program.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (citing Tr., p.

APSI, though, reﬂects

that

programming.” (Conf. Docs,

mind’

7, Ls. 17-19).)

The

p.

him t0 make

the decision Whether 0r not t0 quit

2683.) Contrary to Crockford’s assertion, a professional judged

he was “in his right mind” When he decided t0 quit the programming that he was told he

needed t0 complete
that

in his ‘right

Crockford was evaluated by a clinician before he was permitted t0 sign

out 0f the programming and the clinician “cleared

that

was not

t0

show that he was

suitable for probation. In addition, while the

APSI reﬂects

Crockford was “not currently receiv[ing] mental health treatment,” that was “due t0

requesting an appointment With an

IDOC

[his]

not

clinician 0r requesting psychotropic medications.”

(Conf. D0cs., p. 2684.) Crockford’s failure to take advantage of readily available mental health

treatment—despite, 0f course, being well aware of his
his

successful completion of

relinquishing

its

health history and the fact that

programming was a necessary condition

jurisdiction—is not

good candidate

own mental

somehow

for supervised release.

exculpatory; rather,

Indeed, there

is

little

it is

t0

avoid the court

evidence that he

is

not a

reason t0 think Crockford’s

performance would have been better had he availed himself of treatment. As noted above, the
psychological evaluation suggested that he was not particularly amenable to treatment and he

acknowledged

managing

he received treatment through his

that

his behavior,

managing

1994.) In addition, Crockford

in the psychological

by a professional
The

The

at least

one 0f the forms 0f treatment recommended

evaluation—anger management classes—and withdrew

after

he was judged

be competent t0 make that decision. (Conf. Docs., pp. 2003-04.)

district court

for probation

E.

to

and following the law.” (Conf. Docs., pp. 1975,

his impulses,

was receiving

but continued “t0 have difﬁculty

life

had excellent reason

and did not abuse

District Court

its

Crockford was not a good candidate

by relinquishing

discretion

Did Not Abuse

to believe that

Its

Discretion

jurisdiction.

its

BV Denying

Crockford’s Motion Under

Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b)

“A motion

for reduction

of sentence under I.C.R. 35

addressed t0 the sound discretion 0f the court.” State
381, 385 (Ct. App. 2015).
“the defendant

must show

Where

a sentence

is

V.

is

Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415 P.3d

neither illegal nor excessive

that the sentence is excessive in light

subsequently provided t0 the

district court in

essentially a plea for leniency,

when pronounced,

of new or additional information

support of the motion.” State V. Burggraf, 160 Idaho

177, 180, 369 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing State V. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159

P.3d, 338, 840 (2007)); see State v. Dabney, 159 Idaho 790, 798, 367 P.3d 185, 193 (2016)

(afﬁrming denial of Rule 35 motion that was not supported With any relevant information).
10

“An

appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle t0 review the underlying
sentence absent the presentation of

new

information.” Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at

840.

The

district court

properly determined that Crockford’s Rule 35 motion was not supported

by new evidence showing

was supported by a
12.) In both,

19,

letter

that his sentence

was

(Aug,

excessive.

from his adoptive mother and a

pp. 1-3.) Crockford’s motion

letter that

he authored. (Aug, pp. 10-

they referenced alleged mental and physical health issues, anxiety regarding

and supposed improvement

in his conduct after

he failed in his

As

rider.

COVID-

the district court

recognized, there had been “extensive evaluations” of Crockford, the district court reviewed and
carefully considered those evaluations prior to sentencing, and they discussed Crockford’s alleged

mental and physical inﬁrmities.

(Aug, pp.

evidence. Further, if anxiety about

COVID-19

is

excessive, courts will be

The court

2-3.)

The

constituted

new evidence showing

swamped with Rule 35 motions claiming that

correctly concluded that “anxiety over the Virus

did not include

letters therefore

is

new

that a sentence

sentences are excessive.

a worldwide

phenomenon” and does

not warrant a reduction in Crockford’s sentence. (Aug. p. 2.) Finally, With respect t0 Crockford’s
alleged good behavior, his Rule 35 motion

relinquished

sort

its

jurisdiction for

bad behavior.

was ﬁled only
(R., pp. 72-73;

three

months

Aug., pp. 8-9.)

of dramatic turnaround, within three months, could require the

Crockford’s sentence.

improvement

At any

rate,

to

after the district court

It is

hard t0 see What

Certainly his decision not to ﬁght another inmate, which

Which Crockford

reduce

district court t0

points, does not demonstrate such a turnaround.

is

the alleged

(Aug.

p. 11.)

even crediting Crockford’s reports of his good behavior during the three months

between the court’s decision

to relinquish jurisdiction

and Crockford’s Rule 35 motion,

an abuse of discretion t0 decline a Rule 35 based 0n alleged good behavior.

11

ﬂ

it is

not

State V. Cobler,

148 Idaho 769, 773, 229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010) (“the
giving

17, 20,

little

not abuse

its

discretion in

0r no weight to Cobler’s good behavior while in prison”); State V. Gonzales, 122 Idaho

830 P.2d 528, 531

in denying

district court did

(Ct.

App. 1992) (holding

that district court did not abuse

its

discretion

Rule 35 motion based on progress reports from prison ofﬁcials reporting good

behavior).

The

district court

did not err by denying Crockford’s request for leniency under Idaho

Criminal Rule 35.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment 0f the

district court.

11th day of January, 2021.

Andrew V. Wake
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